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We consider a coalition formation seing where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents’
preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition.
is seing diers from the well-studied Schelling’s model in that some agents may prefer homogeneous
coalitions, while others may prefer to be members of a diverse group, or a group that mostly consists of agents
of the other type. We model this seing as a hedonic game and investigate the existence of stable outcomes
using hedonic games solution concepts. We show that a core stable outcome may fail to exist and checking
the existence of core stable outcomes is computationally hard. On the other hand, we propose an ecient
algorithm to nd an individually stable outcome under the natural assumption that agents’ preferences over
fractions of the agents of their own type are single-peaked.
1 INTRODUCTION
At a conference dinner, researchers split into groups to chat over food. Some junior researchers
prefer to stay in the company of other junior researchers, as they want to relax aer a long day
of talks. Some senior researchers prefer to chat with their friends, who also happen to be senior
researchers. But there are also junior researchers who want to use the dinner as an opportunity to
network with senior researchers, as well as senior researchers who are eager to make the newcomers
feel welcome in the community, and therefore want to talk to as many junior people as possible.
is example can be viewed as an instance of a coalition formation problem. e agents belong
to two types (senior and junior), and their preferences over coalitions are determined by the
fraction of agents of each type in the coalition. is seing is reminiscent of the classic Schelling
model [Schelling, 1969], but there is an important dierence: a standard assumption in the Schelling
model is homophily, i.e., the agents are assumed to prefer to be surrounded by agents of their own
type, though they can tolerate the presence of agents of the other type, as long as their fraction
does not exceed a pre-specied threshold. In contrast, in our example some agents have homophilic
preferences, while others have heterophilic preferences, i.e., they seek out coalitions with agents
who are not like them.
ere is a very substantial body of research on homophily and heterophily in group formation.
It is well-known that in a variety of contexts, ranging from residential location [Schelling, 1969,
Zhang, 2004a,b] to classroom activities and friendship relations [Moody, 2001, Newman, 2010],
individuals prefer to be together with those who are similar to them. ere are also seings where
agents prefer to be in a group with agents of the other type(s): for instance, in a coalition of buyers
and sellers, a buyer prefers to be in a group with many other sellers and no other buyers, so as
to maximize their negotiating power. Aziz et al. [2017, 2014] model this scenario as a Bakers and
Millers game, where a baker wants to be in a coalition with many millers, whereas a miller wants
to be in a coalition with many bakers. However, there are also real-life scenarios where agents
can have dierent aitudes towards diversity: this includes, for instance, language learning by
immersion (with types being learners’ native languages), shared accommodation (with types being
genders), primary and secondary education (with types being races and income groups), etc. In all
these seings we expect the agents to display a broad range of preferences over ratios of dierent
types in their group.
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Our contribution e goal of our paper is to provide strategic foundations for the study of
coalition formation scenarios where each agent may have a dierent degree of homophily. More
concretely, we consider seings where agents are divided into two types (blue and red), and each
agent has preferences regarding the fraction of the agents of her own type, which determine
her preferences over coalitions. For most of our results, we assume that agents’ preferences are
single-peaked, i.e., each agent has a preferred ratio θ of agents of her own type, and prefers one
fraction θ1 to another fraction θ2 if θ1 is closer to θ than θ2 is. Our model allows agents to express a
variety of preferences including both complete homophily and complete heterophily.
We model this seing as a hedonic game, and investigate the existence of stable outcomes
according to several established notions of stability, such as core stability, Nash stability and
individual stability [Banerjee et al., 2001, Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002].
We demonstrate that a core stable outcome may fail to exist, even when all agents have single-
peaked preferences. Moreover, we show that deciding whether a core stable outcome exists is
NP-complete. However, we identify several interesting special cases where the core is guaranteed
to be non-empty.
We then consider stability notions that are dened in terms of individual deviations. ere is
a simple reason why a Nash stable outcome may fail to exist. However, we propose an ecient
algorithm to reach an individually stable outcome, i.e., an outcome where if some agent would
like to deviate from her current coalition to another coalition, at least one agent in the target
coalition would object to the move. Our proof employs a careful and non-trivial adaptation of the
algorithm of Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002] for single-peaked anonymous games. Our algorithm
is decentralized in the sense that, by following a certain set of rules, the agents can form a stable
partition by themselves.
Related work Our work is related to the established line of research that studies the impact of
homophily on residential segregation. e seminal paper of omas Schelling [Schelling, 1969]
introduced a model of residential segregation in which two types of individuals are located on a
line, and at each step a randomly chosen individual moves to a dierent location if the fraction of
the like-minded agents in her neighborhood is below her tolerance ratio. With simple experiments
using dimes and pennies, Schelling [1969] found that any such dynamics almost always reaches a
total segregation even if each agent only has a mild preference for her own type.
Following numerous papers empirically conrming Shelling’s result [Alba and Logan, 1993,
Clark, 2008, Clark and Fosse, 2008, Emerson et al., 2001, Farley et al., 1993, Massey et al., 1994, v. d.
Laan Bouma-Do, 2007], Young [1998] was the rst to provide a rigorous theoretical argument,
showing that stability can only be achieved if agents are divided into homogeneous groups. In
contrast, Brandt et al. [2012] showed that with tolerance parameter being exactly 12 , the average
size of the monochromatic community is independent of the size of the whole system; subsequently,
Immorlica et al. [2017] extended this analysis to the two-dimensional grid. e recent work of
Chauhan et al. [2018] considers a more general utility function, taking into account both the fraction
of the like-minded agents in the neighborhood and the location in which each agent is situated;
they investigate the existence of stable outcomes for several topologies, such as a grid and a ring.
We note, however, that our model is fundamentally dierent from Shelling’s model, for at
least three reasons. First, we do not assume any underlying topology that restricts coalition
formation. Second, the coalitions in an outcome of a hedonic game are pairwise disjoint, while the
neighborhoods in the Schelling model may overlap. Finally, as argued above, our model does not
assume homophilic preferences.
ere is also a substantial literature on stability in hedonic games, starting with the early work
of Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002]. Among the various classes of hedonic games, two classes
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are particularly relevant for our analysis: fractional hedonic games [Aziz et al., 2017, 2014] and
anonymous hedonic games [Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002].
In fractional hedonic games the agents are located on a social network, and they prefer a coalition
C to a coalition C ′ if the fraction of their friends in C is higher than in C ′. e Bakers and Millers
game is an example of a fractional hedonic game, where it is assumed that each baker is a friend of
each miller, but no two agents of the same type are friends. Aziz et al. [2017, 2014], and, subsequently,
Bilo` et al. [2014, 2015] identify several special cases of fractional hedonic games where the set of
core stable outcomes is non-empty. In particular, Aziz et al. [2017, 2014] give a characterization of
the set of strictly core stable outcomes in the Bakers and Millers game.
In anonymous hedonic games agents’ preferences over coalitions depend on the size of these
coalitions only. Similarly to our seing, it is known that with single-peaked anonymous preferences,
there is a natural decentralized process to reach individual stability; however, a core stable outcome
may fail to exist [Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002], and deciding the existence of a core stable
outcome is NP-complete [Ballester, 2004].
ere are also other subclasses of hedonic games where stable outcomes are guaranteed to exist,
such as acyclic hedonic games [Demange, 2004, Igarashi and Elkind, 2016], dichotomous games
[Peters, 2016], and top-responsive games [Alcade and Revilla, 2004].
2 OUR MODEL
For every positive integer s , we denote by [s] the set {1, . . . , s}. We start by dening the class of
games that we are going to consider.
Denition 2.1. A diversity game is a triple G = (R,B, (i )i ∈R∪B ), where R and B are disjoint sets
of agents and for each agent i ∈ R ∪ B it holds that i is a linear order over the set
Θ =
{r
s
 r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |R |}, s ∈ {1, . . . , |R | + |B |}} .
We set N = R ∪ B; the agents in R are called the red agents, and the agents in B are called the blue
agents.
We refer to subsets of N as coalitions. For each i ∈ N , we denote by Ni the set of coalitions
containing i . For each coalition S ⊆ N , we say that S is mixed if it contains both red and blue
agents; a mixed coalition S is called a mixed pair if |S | = 2.
For each agent i ∈ N , we interpret the order i as her preferences over the fraction of the red
agents in a coalition; for instance, if 23 i 35 , this means that agent i prefers a coalition in which
two thirds of the agents are red to a coalition in which three hs of the agents are red.
For each coalition S , we denote by θR (S) the fraction of the red agents in S , i.e., θR (S) = |S∩R ||S | ;
we refer to this fraction as the red ratio of S . For each i ∈ N and S,T ∈ Ni , we say that agent i
strictly prefers S to T if θR (S) i θR (T ), and we say that i weakly prefers S to T if θR (S) = θR (T ) or
θR (S) i θR (T ). A coalition S is said to be individually rational if every agent i in S weakly prefers
S to {i}.
An outcome of a diversity game is a partition of agents in N into disjoint coalitions. Given a
partition pi of N and an agent i ∈ N , we write pi (i) to denote the unique coalition in pi that contains
i . A partition pi of N is said to be individually rational if all coalitions in pi are individually rational.
e core is the set of partitions that are resistant to group deviations. Formally, we say that a
coalition S ⊆ N blocks a partition pi of N if every agent i ∈ S strictly prefers S to her own coalition
pi (i). A partition pi of N is said to be core stable, or in the core, if no coalition S ⊆ N blocks pi .
We also consider outcomes that are immune to individual deviations. Consider an agent i ∈ N
and a pair of coalitions S < Ni and T ∈ Ni . An agent j ∈ S accepts a deviation of i to S if j weakly
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prefers S ∪ {i} to S . A deviation of i fromT to S is said to be an NS-deviation if i prefers S ∪ {i} toT ;
and an IS-deviation if it is an NS-deviation and all agents in S accept it. A partition pi is called Nash
stable (NS) (respectively, individually stable (IS)) if no agent i ∈ N has an NS-deviation (respectively,
an IS-deviation) from pi (i) to another coalition S ∈ pi or to ∅.
We say that the preferences i of an agent i ∈ N are single-peaked if for every i ∈ N there is a
peak pi ∈ [0, 1] such that
θ1 < θ2 6 pi or θ1 > θ2 > pi ⇒ θ2 i θ1.
In particular, if an agent has a strong preference for being in the majority, then her preferences are
single-peaked, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 2.2 (Birds of a feather ock together). Suppose that all agents in R are smokers and all
agents in B are non-smokers. en we expect an agent to prefer groups with the maximum possible
ratio of agents of her own type. Formally, for each r ∈ R and each θ ,θ ′ ∈ Θ we have θ r θ ′ if and
only if θ > θ ′, and for each b ∈ B and each θ ,θ ′ ∈ Θ we have θ b θ ′ if and only if θ < θ ′. In this
case, the partition in which each agent forms a singleton coalition is core stable and Nash stable
(and hence also individually stable).
If an agent strongly prefers to be surrounded by agents of the other type, her preferences are
single-peaked, too.
Example 2.3 (Bakers and Millers [Aziz et al., 2014]). Suppose that each agent prefers the fraction
of agents of the other type to be as high as possible. is holds, for instance, when individuals of
the same type compete to trade with individuals of the other type. A Bakers and Millers game is a
diversity game where for each r ∈ R and each θ ,θ ′ ∈ Θ we have θ r θ ′ if and only if θ < θ ′, and
for each b ∈ B and each θ ,θ ′ ∈ Θ we have θ b θ ′ if and only if θ > θ ′. Note that if |R | = |B |, a
partition into mixed pairs is core stable and Nash stable; indeed, Aziz et al. [2014] prove that every
Bakers and Millers game has a non-empty core.
3 CORE STABILITY
Examples 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate that if all agents have extreme homophilic or extreme heterophilic
preferences, the core is guaranteed to be non-empty. However, we will now show that in the
intermediate case the core may be empty, even if all agents have single-peaked preferences.
Example 3.1. Consider a diversity gameG , where the set of agents is given byR = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7}
and B = {b1,b2}. Agents can be divided into the following three categories with essentially the
same preferences: X = {r1, r2, r3, r4,b1}, Y = {r5}, and Z = {r6, r7,b2}. We have Θ = {0, 13 , 12 , 35 , 23 ,
5
7 ,
3
4 ,
7
9 ,
4
5 ,
5
6 ,
6
7 ,
7
8 , 1}. Each agent has the following single-peaked preferences over the ratios of red
agents:
• r1, r2, r3, r4 : 67  56  45  79  34  78  1  57  · · ·
• b1 : 67  56  45  79  34  78  57  · · ·
• r5 : 56  45  79  34  67  78  1  57  · · ·
• b2 : 34  79  45  56  67  78  57  · · ·
• r6, r7 : 34  79  45  56  67  78  1  57  · · ·
Figure 1 illustrates the preferences of each preference category of red agents.
We will now argue that the game in Example 3.1 has empty core.
Proposition 3.2. e game G in Example 3.1 has no core stable outcomes.
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Fig. 1. Single-peaked preferences over the ratios of red agents. The thick, grey, and doed lines represent the
preferences of agents in X , Y , and Z , respectively. We omit the ratios 13 ,
1
2 ,
2
3 since there is no individually
rational coalition with these fractions of red agents.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that there exists a core stable outcome pi . We note that,
by individual rationality, θR (S) > 3/4 for every mixed coalition S ∈ pi , as red agents in a coalition
S with θR (S) 6 5/7 < 3/4 would strictly prefer to be alone. Also, pi contains at least one mixed
coalition, as otherwise {r1, r2, r3,b1} would block pi .
Let θ ∗ be the largest ratio of red agents in a mixed coalition in pi . We have argued that θ ∗ > 3/4.
Also, if 3/4 6 θ ∗ 6 4/5, then θR (pi (x)) 6 4/5 for all x ∈ X and 3/4 6 θR (pi (r5)) 6 4/5 or
θR (pi (r5)) = 1; thus coalition X ∪ Y with θR (X ∪ Y ) = 5/6 blocks pi . Hence, θ ∗ > 5/6. Now since pi
contains at least one mixed coalition with red ratio at least 5/6, and all mixed coalitions in pi must
have red ratio at least 3/4, if there is more than one mixed coalition, the number of agents would
be at least 10, a contradiction. us, pi contains exactly one mixed coalition of red ratio at least 5/6.
It follows that for each agent i it holds that either
• i belongs to a mixed coalition of red ratio at least 5/6, i.e., θR (pi (i)) > 5/6; or
• i belongs to a completely homogeneous coalition, i.e., if i ∈ Y , then θR (pi (i)) = 0 and if
i ∈ R, then θR (pi (i)) = 1.
In particular, this means that θR (pi (z)) , 3/4 for all z ∈ Z , and hence each z ∈ Z prefers 3/4 to
θR (pi (z)).
Now suppose that r5 does not belong to a coalition with his favorite red ratio, i.e., 5/6. en
θR (pi (r5)) > 6/7 and thus r5 prefers 3/4 to θR (pi (r5)). us, the coalition Y ∪ Z of red ratio 3/4
blocks pi , a contradiction. Hence, r5 belongs to a coalition of his favorite red ratio 5/6, and thus
θ ∗ = 5/6. Further, if some agent r ∈ X ∩ R does not belong to a mixed coalition, then θR (pi (r )) = 1
and the coalition {r }∪Z would block pi . Hence, the unique mixed coalition of red ratio 5/6 contains
both r5 and all four red agents in X , which means that no red agent in Z belongs to the mixed
coalition. Now we have:
• b1 ∈ X ∩ B prefers 6/7 to θR (pi (b1)) since θR (pi (b1)) = 0 or θR (pi (b1)) = 5/6; and
• each x ∈ X ∩ R prefers 6/7 to θR (pi (x)) = 5/6; and
• each z ∈ Z ∩ R prefers 6/7 to θR (pi (z)) = 1.
en coalition X ∪ (Z ∩ R) of red ratio 6/7 would block pi , a contradiction. We conclude that G
does not admit a core stable partition. 
Indeed, we can show that checking whether a given diversity game has a non-empty core is
NP-complete.
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Theorem 3.3. e problem of checking whether a diversity game G = (R,B, (i )i ∈R∪B ) has a
non-empty core is NP-complete.
Proof. Checking core stability can be done in polynomial time and hence our problem is in
NP. Indeed, for each size of a coalition s ∈ [n] and each number r ∈ {0} ∪ [|R |], we can check in
polynomial time if there is a blocking coalition of size s including r red players: We consider the
set Ss,r of all players who strictly prefer the ratio rs to their ratio under pi and verify whether Ss,r
admits a subset of size at least s that contains r red players; if this is the case, there is a coalition of
size exactly s that strongly blocks pi . If no such coalition exists, pi is core stable.
We reduce from the problem of deciding whether the core of an anonymous hedonic game is
non-empty. A hedonic game is called anonymous if all players only care about the sizes of their
coalition. Formally, an anonymous hedonic game is a pair (N , (>i )i ∈N ), where N is a set of agents
and for each agent i ∈ N it holds that >i is a linear order over the set [|N |] of coalition sizes.
Ballester [Ballester, 2004] has shown that deciding whether the core of an anonymous hedonic
game is non-empty is NP-hard.
Let n be the number of players and let the preferences of the players be encoded as follows
ai : s(i, 1)  s(i, 2)  · · ·  s(i,n),
where s(i, `) denotes `th most preferred the coalition size of agent i .1 We construct our equivalent
hedonic diversity game instance as follows. First, for each original player we introduce one blue
agent
bi :
1
s(i, 1) + 1 
1
s(i, 2) + 1  · · · 
1
s(i,N ) + 1  0.
Naturally, the preferences of the original player ai with respect to coalitions of size s shall be
represented by the preference of player bi with respect to coalitions with s blue players and exactly
one red player. For each possible coalition size 1 6 t 6 n from the original game, we introduce
dn/te + 1 red players r `t that would accept to be in a coalition with t blue player and otherwise
prefer to be alone:
r `t :
1
t + 1  1,∀1 6 ` 6 dn/te + 1
If we could guarantee that every mixed coalition has at most one red player, then, the correctness
proof would be almost immediate. It might, however, happen that there are coalitions with more
then one red player. In the following correctness proof, we will see that these coalitions are
unproblematic.
Formally, we show that the core of the original anonymous hedonic game is non-empty if and
only if the core of the newly constructed hedonic diversity game is non-empty.
For the rst direction, assume that the core of the anonymous game was non-empty. at means
there is a partition pi = {P1, P2, . . . , Pk } of the original players into coalitions so that no blocking
coalition exists. We build a core-stable partition pi ′ = {P ′1, P ′2, . . . , P ′k , PR } of our newly constructed
hedonic diversity game instance from pi as follows: P ′j = {bi | ai ∈ Pj } ∪ {r `t }, where t = |Pj | and
` = |{Px | x 6 j ∧ |Px | = t}| and PR = R \ (⋃ Pj ) simply contains all remaining red players.
Assume towards a contradiction that there was a blocking coalition C∗ of players that blocks pi ′.
We rst argue that we can assume w.l.g. that C∗ contains at most one red player. Of course, C∗
cannot contain only red players because every red player in pi ′ is either in PR and, thus, already
only with other red players or it is by denition of pi ′ in one of its most preferred coalition. Now,
assume C∗ contains y red players. By the denition of the preferences of the red players, |C∗ |
must be the red player’s most preferred coalition ratio. at is, the number of blue players in C∗
1For technical reasons, we assume that always all sizes between 1 and n are listed, including irrational ones.
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must be divisible by y. is immediately implies that there is a smaller blocking coalition C∗∗
which consists of one aribitrary red player from C∗ and (|C∗ | − y)/y arbitrary blue players from C∗.
Finally, C∗ (now containing exactly one red player) can only be blocking because every blue player
prefers a coalition with one red and |C∗ | − 1 blue players towards its current coalition in pi ′. e
way we constructed the preferences of of blue players ensures that this implies that the coalition
CA = {ai | bi ∈ C∗} must be a blocking coalition for pi—a contradiction.
For the second direction, assume that the core of the diversity game was non-empty. at means
there is a partition
pi ′ = {P ′1, P ′2, . . . , P ′k , P ′R }
of the blue and red players into coalitions so that no blocking coalition exists.
We assume w.l.g. that all coalitions P ′j are mixed and P ′R contains only red players. First, there
could exist multiple purely red coalitions but merging them into one gives a partition that must
be core stable if and only if the original partition was. Second, we can easily observe that P ′R is
non-empty, because no player prefers mixed coalitions with a majority of red players and there are
much more red than blue players. ird, a purely blue coalition cannot exist. Every blue player
prefers coalitions with as many red as blue players to those coalitions and there are always enough
red players available that would be willing to pair up. (Since one of the s(i, `) equals 1, ratio 12
is preferred to 0.) Finally, for each integer 1 6 t 6 n coalition PR must contain at least one red
player r `t which would prefer to be in a coalition with t blue players. Let us refer to this number
as `(t).
Furthermore, we can assume that w.l.g. each P ′j contains at exactly one red player. Every red
player that is contained in some P ′j must be in a coalition that has the player’s most preferred ratio
of red player, otherwise the player would be in PR . In particular, this means that if there are y red
players in P ′j , then all these players must be of the same type and prefer coalitions with a ratio
of yy(t+1) red players for some integer t . Clearly, spliing up P
′
j into y coalitions with exactly one
red player and exactly t blue players will give us another core stable partition, because these new
coaltions have exactly the same ratio as P ′j has.
With all these assumptions, we are now ready to dene a partition pi = {P1, . . . , Pk } for the players
of the original anonymous hedonic game instance via Pj = {ai | bi ∈ P ′j }. Finally, assume towards
a contradiction that there would be a coalition CA that blocks pi . en, using our assumptions on
pi ′ and the denition of the players preferences, the coalition C∗ = {bi | ai ∈ CA} ∪ r `t , where
t = |CA | and ` = `(t), would be a blocking coalition for pi : Player r `t comes from PR and, hence,
clearly prefersC∗ and the blue players, by denition of their preferences, preferC∗ if and only if the
corresponding original players prefer a size t coalition towards their current ones—a contradiction
that there is a blocking coalition for pi . 
In Example 3.1 there are at least two agents of each type. In contrast, if one of the types is
represented by a single agent, then the core is guaranteed to be non-empty.
Proposition 3.4. Let G = (R,B, (i )i ∈R∪B ) be a diversity game with |R | = 1 or |B | = 1. en the
core of G is non-empty, and a partition in the core can be constructed in polynomial time.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that R = {r }. Let Θr be the set of ratios of red agents
in individually rational coalitions to which r belongs, i.e.,
Θr = {θR (S) | r ∈ S ⊆ R ∪ B ∧ S is individually rational}.
Take r ’s favorite ratio θ ∗ among the fractions in Θr . Construct a coalition S∗ with θR (S∗) = θ ∗ and
put the rest of blue agents into singletons. Clearly, the resulting partition pi is not blocked by any
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coalition of blue agents. Also, if there exists a coalition S that contains the red agent r and blocks pi ,
then θR (S) r θ ∗ and S is individually rational, contradicting the choice of θ ∗. us, the resulting
partition is core stable. 
We also note that in the game in Example 3.1 agents’ preferences belong to one of the three
categories. e next proposition shows that if all agents have the same preferences, then there is a
core stable outcome. We conjecture that with only two types of single-peaked preferences, the core
is non-empty as well.
Proposition 3.5. Let G = (R,B, (i )i ∈R∪B ) be a diversity game such that each agent has the same
preference over Θ \ {0, 1}. en G has a non-empty core and a partition in the core can be constructed
in polynomial time.
Proof. We claim that our game satises the top coalition property: for each S ⊆ N , there exists a
top coalition T ⊆ S such that every agent in T weakly prefers T to every other coalition contained
in S . Indeed, take any S ⊆ N . If there is an agent i ∈ S who weakly prefers his own coalition {i} to
every mixed coalition contained in S , then taking T = {i} certies the existence of a top coalition.
us, suppose otherwise, i.e., every agent in S strictly prefers some mixed coalition to his own
singleton. As every agent has the same ranking over the fractions of red agents in mixed coalitions,
there is a mixed coalitionT ⊆ S such that θR (T ) is the favorite red ratio for every agent inT among
the ratios of red agents in the subsets of S , which means that T is a top coalition. is argument
also gives us an ecient algorithm for identifying a top coalition: it suces to check whether
some singleton forms a top coalition, and, if not, nd the agents’ most preferred ratio that can be
implemented in Θ \ {0, 1} and construct a coalition with this red ratio.
We can now construct a stable partition by repeatedly identifying a top coalition with respect to
the current set of agents, adding it to the partition, and removing the agents in that coalition from
the current set of agents; it is clear that this procedure can be executed in polynomial time, and
Banerjee et al. [2001] argue that it produces a core stable outcome. 
4 NASH STABILITY AND INDIVIDUAL STABILITY
We have seen that core stability may be impossible to achieve. It is therefore natural to ask whether
every diversity game has an outcome that is immune to individual deviations. It is easy to see
that the answer is ‘no’ if we consider NS-deviations, even if we restrict ourselves to single-peaked
preferences: for instance, the game where there is one red agent who prefers to be alone and one
blue agent who prefers to be in a mixed coalition has no Nash stable outcomes.
In contrast, each diversity game with single-peaked preferences admits an individually stable
outcome. Moreover, such an outcome can be computed in polynomial time. In the remainder of this
section, we will present an algorithm that achieves this, and prove that it is correct. e algorithm
will be divided into three parts:
(1) For agents with peaks greater than half, make mixed coalitions with red majority. For
agents with peaks smaller than half, make mixed coalitions with blue majority.
(2) Make pairs from the remaining red agents and blue agents who are not in the mixed
coalitions.
(3) Put all the remaining agents into singletons.
We will rst show that one can construct a sequence of mixed coalitions with red majority that are
immune to IS-deviations.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of how HALF(R,B, (i )i ∈R∪B ) creates coalitions with red majority. Gray circles correspond
to red agents, while white circles correspond to blue agents.
4.1 Create mixed coalitions with red majority
In making mixed coalitions, we will employ a technique that is similar to the algorithm for anony-
mous games proposed by Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002]. Intuitively, imagine that red agents
and blue agents with peaks at least 1/2 form two lines, each of which is ordered from the highest
peak to the lowest peak. e agents enter a room in this order, with a single blue agent entering
rst and red agents successively joining it as long as the fraction of red agents does not exceed the
minimum peak of the agents already in the room. Once the fraction of the red agents reaches the
minimum peak, a red agent who enters the room may deviate to a coalition that has been formed
before. We alternate these two procedures as long as there is a red agent who can be added without
exceeding the minimum peak. If no red agent can enter a room, then agents start entering another
room and create a new mixed coalition in the same way. e algorithm terminates if either all red
agents or all blue agents with their peaks at least half join a mixed coalition. Figure 2 illustrates this
coalition formation process. We formalize this idea in Algorithm 1. We will create mixed coalitions
containing exactly one blue agent, so we dene the virtual peak qi to be the favorite ratio of agent i
among the ratios of red agents in coalitions containing exactly one blue agent.
In what follows, we assume that S0, S1, . . . , Sk are the nal coalitions that have been obtained
at the termination of the algorithm, and that pi is the output returned by the algorithm. For each
t > 0 and i ∈ St ,
• i is called a default agent of St if i is a blue agent or i is a red agent who has joined St at
Step 9;
• i is called a new agent of St if i is a red agent who has joined St in Step 14 or Step 19.
We denote by Dt the set of default agents of St , and we denote by Nt the set of new agents of St .
For each St with t > 0, each agent in St is either a default agent of a new agent. Notice that S0
starts with the empty set and plays the role of the last resort option for red agents, i.e., red agents
can always deviate to S0 if they strictly prefer staying alone to the mixed coalition they have joined.
Deviations of blue agents We will rst show that the algorithm constructs a sequence of
coalitions such that no blue agent in the coalitions has an IS-deviation to other coalitions. We
establish this by proving a sequence of claims. First, it is immediate that the red ratio of each
coalition St is at least half, except for the last coalition, which may contain a single blue agent.
Lemma 4.1. For each S ∈ pi , the red ratio of S is at least half, i.e., θR (S) > 12 .
Proof. Take any S ∈ pi . e claim is immediate when S ⊆ S0. Suppose that S = St for some
t > 0. en it is clear that St contains exactly one blue agent. If St contains no red agent, then
this would mean that all red agents with their peaks at least half joined St , but deviated to smaller
indexed-coalitions, meaning that St is the last coalition that has been formed, i.e., t = k ; but this
contradicts the construction in Step 21. us, St contains exactly one blue agent and at least one
red agent, which implies that θR (St ) > 12 . 
is leads to the following lemma.
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Algorithm 1: HALF(R,B, (i )i ∈R∪B )
input :A single-peaked diversity game (R,B, (i )i ∈R∪B )
output :pi
1 sort red and blue agents so that qr1 > qr2 > . . .qrx and qb1 > qb2 > . . . > qby ;
2 initialize i ← 1, k ← 1 and S0 ← ∅;
3 initialize R′← { r ∈ R | pr > 12 } and B′← {b ∈ B | pb > 12 };
4 while R′ , ∅ and B′ , ∅ do
5 set Sk ← {bk };
6 while θR (Sk ∪ {ri }) 6 min{qri ,qbk }, or there exist a agent r ∈ Sk ∩ R and t < k such that r
has an IS-deviation from Sk to St do
7 // add red agents to Sk as long as the ratio of red agents does not
exceed the minimum virtual peak;
8 while θR (Sk ∪ {ri }) 6 min{qri ,qbk } do
9 set Sk ← Sk ∪ {ri };
10 set R′← R′ \ {ri } and i ← i + 1;
11 // let red agents in Sk deviate to smaller-indexed coalitions;
12 if there exists an agent r ∈ Sk ∩ R and t < k such that r has an IS-deviation from Sk to St
then
13 choose r and St so that θR (St ∪ {r }) is r ’s most preferred ratio among the coalitions
St satisfying the above;
14 set St ← St ∪ {r }, Sk ← St \ {r };
15 set B′← B′ \ {bk }, and k ← k + 1;
16 // let the remaining agents deviate to mixed coalitions as long as they
prefer the ratio of the deviating coalition to half;
17 while there is an agent r ∈ R′ and a coalition St such that t > 0, θR (St ∪ {r }) r 12 , and all
agents in St accept a deviation of r to St do
18 choose r and St so that θR (St ∪ {r }) is r ’s most preferred ratio among the coalitions St
satisfying the above;
19 St ← St ∪ {r } and R′← R′ \ {r } ;
20 if R′ = ∅ and Sk consists of a single blue agent then
21 return pi = { {r } | r ∈ S0 } ∪ {S1, S2, . . . , Sk−1};
22 else
23 return pi = { {r } | r ∈ S0 } ∪ {S1, S2, . . . , Sk };
Lemma 4.2. For each r ∈ S0, r is a red agent and r strictly prefers {r } to a mixed pair.
Proof. By construction every agent in S0 is a red agent. Suppose that before joining S0, r has
joined a mixed coalition St with t > 0 at Step 9 and then deviated to S0 at Step 14. Just before r
has le St , the ratio θ ′ of red agents in St is at least half, implying that θ ′ r 12 or θ ′ = 12 . Since r
joined S0 at Step 14, we also have 1 r θ ′. Combining these yields 1 r 12 . e claim is immediate
when r joined S0 at Step 19. 
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We also observe that, by the construction of the algorithm, all default agents belong to the
coalition whose red ratio is at most their virtual peak; see Figure (3a) for an illustration.
Lemma 4.3. For every default agent i in St , where St ∈ pi with t > 0,
(1) the red ratio of St is at most i’s virtual peak, i.e., θR (St ) 6 qi ; and
(2) i weakly prefers St to {i} and to a mixed pair.
Proof. Take any t > 0 and take any default agent i in St . Before the algorithm starts forming
the next coalition St+1, the ratio θR (St ) remains below qi by the while-condition in Step 6. Aer
St+1 starts being formed, θR (St ) can only increase by accepting red agents from larger-indexed
coalitions. However, if a deviation of some red agent to St increases the fraction above qi , this
would mean that i would not be willing to accept such a deviation. us, θR (St ) 6 qi . To show the
second statement, recall that pi > 12 by construction of the algorithm and θR (St ) > 12 by Lemma 4.1.
If i is a blue agent, then by single-peakedness i weakly prefers St both to her own singleton and to
a mixed pair. If i is a red agent who has joined St at Step 9, then by single-peakedness and the fact
that he has not deviated to S0 at Step 14, i weakly prefers St both to his singleton and to a mixed
pair. 
We are now ready to prove that no coalition in pi admits a deviation of a blue agent.
Lemma 4.4. For each S ∈ pi , there is an agent in S who does not accept a deviation of a blue agent
to S .
Proof. If S ⊆ S0 and |S | = 1, it follows from Lemma 4.2 that no r ∈ S accepts a deviation of a
blue agent. Suppose S = St for some t > 0, and assume towards a contradiction that some blue
agent b ∈ B can be accepted by all agents in St ∈ pi for some t > 0. By Lemma 4.1, the ratio of red
agents in St is at least 12 . If the fraction of red agents in St is at most the peak of some agent, i.e.,
θR (St ) 6 pi for some agent i ∈ St , this means that
θR (St ∪ {b}) < θR (St ) 6 pi ,
i.e., i would not accept b, a contradiction. Hence, suppose that the fraction of red agents in St is
beyond the maximum peak, i.e., θR (St ) > maxi ∈St pi . Take i ∈ St ∩ B. By Lemma 4.3,
pi < θR (St ) 6 qi .
Since pi > 12 by construction of the algorithm, we have θR (St ) > 12 , which means that coalition
St contains one blue agent and at least two red agents. Hence, even if one red agent leaves the
coalition, its red ratio would be at least half, i.e.,
1
2 6
|St ∩ R | − 1
|St | − 1 (:= θ
∗) < pi ,
where the second inequality holds, since otherwise pi 6 θ ∗ < θR (St ) 6 qi , which contradicts
the fact that qi is i’s favorite ratio of the coalitions containing exactly one blue agent. Further,
agent i prefers θR (St ) to θ ∗ by single-peakedness and by the fact that θ ∗ < θR (St ) 6 qi . Since
i accepts the deviation of b to St , aer adding b to St , the red ratio should remain at least θ ∗,
implying that θ ∗ < θR (St ∪ {b}). But this would mean that |St∩R |−1|St |−1 <
|St∩R |
|St |+1 , or, equivalently,(|St | + 1)(|St ∩ R | − 1) < |St ∩ R |(|St | − 1). is inequality can be simplied to 2|St ∩ R | < |St | + 1,
implying θ ∗ < 12 , a contradiction. 
Deviations of red agents We will now show that coalitions S1, . . . , Sk do not admit an IS-deviation
by red agents. To this end, we rst observe that the red ratio of a coalition to which a new agent
belongs exceeds the virtual peak of the new agent; see Figure (3b) for an illustration. Due to
single-peakedness, this means that new agents do not accept further deviations of red agents.
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(a) Virtual peak of a default agent.
θqrθR(St ′) θR(St)
(b) Virtual peak of a new agent.
Fig. 3. The red ratio of a coalition does not exceed the virtual peak of a default agent, but exceeds the virtual
peak of a new agent.
Lemma 4.5. Let S be the set of agents that belong to St with t > 0 aer the while-loop of Step 8
of Algorithm 1, and let ri be the last agent in S to join St . en no red agent r j with j > i can join S
without exceeding the minimum peak, i.e., θR (S ∪ {r j }) > min{qbt ,qr j }.
Proof. Take any r j with j > i . If θR (S ∪ {r j }) 6 min{qbt ,qr j }, then this would mean that
θR (S ∪ {ri+1}) 6 min{qbt ,qri+1 }, since qri+1 > qr j . Hence the algorithm would have added ri+1 to
S , a contradiction. 
Lemma 4.6. For all St ∈ pi with t > 0 and each new agent r ∈ St :
(1) the red ratio of St exceeds r ’s virtual peak, i.e., θR (St ) > qr ;
(2) r is the unique new agent in St ;
(3) r weakly prefers St to {r } and to a mixed pair.
Proof. Let r be the rst new agent who joined St at Step 14 or Step 19. When r joined St , his
virtual peak qr was at most that of any other red agent in St . By Lemma 4.5, he cannot join St
without exceeding the virtual peak qr , i.e., θR (Dt ∪ {r }) < qr . us, by single-peakedness, he does
not accept any further deviations by red agents. Hence, r is the unique new agent in St . To see
that the third statement holds, note that if r joined St at Step 19, then r prefers θR (St ) to 12 by the
if-condition of Step 17. Also, r chooses his favorite coalition among the coalitions to which he
can deviate, and thus r prefers θR (St ) to θR (S0 ∪ {r }) = 1. Now suppose that r joined St from St ′
with t ′ > t at Step 14. At that point, the ratio θ ′ of red agents in St ′ was at least half, and agent
r weakly prefers St ′ to a mixed pair since 12 6 θ ′ 6 qr . Hence, since r prefers θR (St ) to θ ′, by
transitivity r prefers θR (St ) to 12 . Also, by the if-condition in Step 12, r prefers St to being in a
singleton coalition. 
We also observe that the red ratio of a higher-indexed coalition is smaller than or equal to that
of a lower-indexed coalition.
Lemma 4.7. Let t ′ > t > 0 and let S be the set of agents in St just aer the while-loop of Step 8.
en θR (Dt ′) 6 θR (S); in particular, θR (Dt ′) 6 θR (Dt ).
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction thatθR (Dt ′) > θR (S). Since S andDt ′ contain exactly
one blue agent, this means that Dt ′ contains more red agents than S does, i.e., |S ∩R |+ 1 6 |Dt ′ ∩R |.
us, even if we add a red agent to S , its red ratio does not exceed θR (Dt ′), i.e., for each r ∈ R \ S
we have θR (S ∪ {r }) 6 θR (Dt ′). Now recall that by Lemma 4.3, the red ratio of St ′ does not exceed
the virtual peak of each default agent, which means that
θR (Dt ′) 6 θR (St ′) 6 min
x ∈Dt ′
qx .
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Combining these observations, for every r ∈ R \ S we have
θR (S ∪ {r }) 6 min
x ∈Dt ′
qx . (4.1)
Moreover, since t = t ′, or St ′ has been created aer St , there is a red agent r j ∈ Dt ′ \ S with
qr j 6 qr for every r ∈ S ∩ R and qb′ 6 qb , where b ′ and b are the unique blue agents in Dt ′ and S ,
respectively. Combining this with inequality (4.1) yields
θR (S ∪ {r j }) 6 min
x ∈S∪{r j }
qx ,
which contradicts Lemma 4.5. 
Lemma 4.8. Let t ′ > t > 0 with θR (Dt ′) = θR (Dt ). en some agent in Dt ′ does not accept a
deviation of a red agent to St ′ .
Proof. Since θR (Dt ′) = θR (Dt ), both Dt and Dt ′ contain exactly one blue agent as well as the
same number of red agents. By the description of the algorithm, the minimum virtual peak of
agents in Dt ′ is smaller than that of agents in Dt , i.e.,
min
x ∈Dt ′
qx 6 min
x ∈Dt
qx . (4.2)
Further, by Lemma 4.5, no red agent in Dt ′ can join Dt without exceeding the minimum virtual
peak, which implies that for every r ∈ Dt ′ we have
min
x ∈Dt∪{r }
qx < θR (Dt ∪ {r }) = |Dt
′ ∩ R | + 1
|Dt ′ | + 1 .
Combining this with the inequality (4.2) implies
min
x ∈Dt ′
qx <
|Dt ′ ∩ R | + 1
|Dt ′ | + 1 .
us, by single-peakedness, there is an agent in Dt ′ who does not accept a deviation of a red agent
to Dt ′ . 
We are now ready to show that no coalition in pi admits a deviation of a red agent.
Lemma 4.9. No agent r ∈ St ∩ R has an IS-deviation to another coalition St ′ with 0 < t ′ < t .
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that there is such an agent r ∈ St ∩R and a coalition St ′
with 0 < t ′ < t . Let t ′ be the largest index of coalition St ′ to which r has an IS-deviation. Observe
that if St ′ contains a new agent, then the new agent does not accept a deviation of agent r by
Lemma 4.6; thus, St ′ has no new agent and St ′ = Dt ′ . If r is a default agent in St , then r weakly
prefers St to Dt and hence r strictly prefers Dt ′ ∪ {r } to Dt by transitivity. us, agent r could have
deviated to St ′ from St at Step 14, a contradiction. If r is a new agent in St , then r joined St in Step
14 or Step 19, but this means that r could have deviated to St ′ instead of St , as r strictly prefers
Dt ′ ∪ {r } to Dt ∪ {r }, a contradiction. 
Lemma 4.10. No agent r ∈ St ∩ R has an IS-deviation to another coalition St ′ with t ′ > t .
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that there is such an agent r ∈ St ∩R and a coalition St ′ .
Let t ′ > t be the smallest index of coalition St ′ to which r has an IS-deviation. Again, if St ′ contains
a new agent, then r cannot deviate to St ′ ; thus, St ′ = Dt ′ , and θR (St ′) = θR (Dt ′) 6 θR (Dt ) 6 θR (St )
by Lemma 4.7.
First, consider the case where agent r is a default agent in St and t > 0. en, by Lemma 4.3
and by the fact that θR (St ′) 6 θR (St ), we have θR (St ′) 6 θR (St ) 6 qr . Since r ’s preferences are
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single-peaked, r has an incentive to join St ′ only if θR (St ′) = θR (St ); however, by Lemma 4.8 this
implies that there is an agent in St ′ who is not willing to accept r ’s deviation, a contradiction.
Second, consider the case where agent r joined St at Step 14. Let S` be the coalition to which the
red agent r belonged before joining St , and let S be the set of agents in S` just before r deviated
from S` to St at Step 14. Note that S` is a coalition that has been created before St ′ emerged,
i.e., ` 6 t ′, since otherwise r would have deviated to St ′ instead of St at Step 14. By Lemma
4.7, θR (Dt ′) is at most θR (S) and θR (S) 6 qr by the description of the algorithm. Now we have
θR (Dt ′) 6 θR (S) 6 qr < θR (St ).
Recall that r strictly prefers St to S ; thus, by single-peakedness, r has an incentive to deviate
from St to St ′ only if θR (Dt ′) = θR (S). Since θR (D`) 6 θR (S) by Lemma 4.7, this means that
θR (Dt ′) = θR (D`). Also, if ` < t ′, some agent in Dt ′ does not accept the deviation of r by Lemma
4.8, and hence ` = t ′. us, agent r deviated from St ′ to St and later the coalition St ′ regained the
same number of red agents as before. Now, if θR (S) = qr , then r would not have le the coalition
S at Step 14; hence θR (S) < qr , which implies θR (Dt ′ ∪ {r }) 6 qr . Recall that by Lemma 4.3, the
red ratio of Dt ′ is at most the minimum virtual peak, i.e., θR (Dt ′) 6 minx ∈Dt ′ qx . If adding r to Dt ′
exceeds the minimum, some agent would not accept a deviation of r ; thus, we have
θR (Dt ′ ∪ {r }) 6 min
x ∈Dt ′∪{r }
qx . (4.3)
Now, since θR (S \ {r }) < θ (Dt ′), there is at least one red agent r j ∈ Dt ′ who does not belong to S .
By (4.3),
θ (S ∪ {r j }) = θ (Dt ′ ∪ {r }) 6 min
x ∈Dt ′∪{r }
qx 6 min
x ∈S∪{r j }
qx ,
contradicting Lemma 4.5.
Finally, consider the case where r joined St at Step 19. Since St ′ does not contain any new agents,
agent r could have joined St ′ instead of St at Step 19, a contradiction. 
4.2 Algorithm for individual stability
We will now construct an individually stable outcome using the algorithm described in Section 4.1
as a subroutine. Suppose that we are given a diversity game (R,B, (i )i ∈R∪B ). For each i ∈ R ∪ B,
we denote by Bi the preference over the ratios of the blue agents in each coalition: θ1 Bi θ2 if and
only if (1 − θ1) i (1 − θ2).
Now let piR , piB , pipair, and pisingle denote the partitions computed by Algorithm 2, and let pi =
piR∪piB∪pipair∪pisingle. Arguing as in the previous section, we can establish the following properties.
Lemma 4.11. For each A ∈ {R,B} and each coalition S ∈ piA it holds that:
(a) S is individually rational;
(b) if i joined S at Step 11, then i does not accept a further deviation of an agent in A to S ;
(c) there is an agent who does not admit a deviation of an agent in N \A;
(d) for each agent i ∈ S who joined S before Step 11 of Algorithm 2, i weakly prefers S to a mixed
pair.
Proof. Without loss of generality suppose that A is the set of red agents. Claim (a) (individual
rationality) holds due to Lemmas 4.3 and 4.6 and the while-condition in Step 9 of Algorithm 2.
To show claim (b), suppose that a red agent r is the rst agent who joined S ∈ piR at Step 11. By
single-peakedness, the claim holds when pr 6 12 ; so suppose pr >
1
2 . Since r did not belong to any
of the coalitions in piR before, his virtual peak qr is at most that of any other red agent in S . Since
all agents in S \ {r } accept r at Step 9 of Algorithm 2, S did not contain a new agent by Lemma
4.6, so the red ratio of S \ {r } is at most the minimum virtual peak of agents in S \ {r } by Lemma
14
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for an individually stable outcome
input :A single-peaked diversity game (R,B, (i )i ∈R∪B )
output :pi
1 make mixed coalitions with red majority, i.e., set piR = HALF(R,B, (i )i ∈R∪B ) ;
2 let Rle ← R \⋃S ∈piR S and Ble ← B \⋃S ∈piR S ;
3 make mixed coalitions with blue majority, i.e., set piB = HALF(Ble,Rle, (Bi )i ∈Rle∪Ble );
4 set Rle ← Rle \⋃S ∈piB S , and Ble ← Ble \⋃S ∈piB S ;
5 make mixed pairs from remaining agents in Rle and Ble who prefer a coalition of ratio 12 to
his or her own singleton; add them to pipair ;
6 set Rle ← Rle \⋃S ∈pipair S , and Ble ← Ble \⋃S ∈pipair S ;
7 // let the remaining agents deviate to mixed coalitions as long as they
prefer the deviating coalition to his or her singleton;
8 foreach A ∈ {R,B} do
9 while there is a agent i ∈ Ale and a mixed coalition S ∈ piA such that S ∪ {i} is individually
rational and all agents in S accept a deviation of i to S do
10 choose such pair i and S where θA(S ∪ {i}) is i’s most preferred ratio among the
coalitions S satisfying the above;
11 piA ← piA \ {S} ∪ {S ∪ {i}}, and Ale ← Ale \ {i};
12 put all the remaining agents in Rle and Ble into singletons, and add them to pisingle;
13 return pi = piR ∪ piB ∪ pipair ∪ pisingle;
4.3 and this remains true aer accepting r . However, by Lemma 4.5, agent r cannot join S without
exceeding either the virtual peak of the unique blue agent or the virtual peak qr ; thus, θR (S) < qr .
By single-peakedness, we conclude that r does not accept any further deviation of red agents.
To prove claim (c), we can use the argument in the proof of Lemma 4.4. To establish claim (d), we
recall that each agent i ∈ S weakly prefers S to a mixed pair by Lemmas 4.3 and 4.6; by transitivity,
this still holds aer accepting the deviation of red agents at Step 11 of Algorithm 2. 
Lemma 4.12. Mixed pairs created at Step 5 of Algorithm 2 do not admit an IS-deviation.
Proof. Let R′ and B′ be the set of red and blue agents in Rle and Ble just before Step 5 of
Algorithm 2, respectively. Note that both R′ and B′ are non-empty only if red agents (respectively,
blue agents) are le when mixed coalitions with red majority have been formed, and blue agents
(respectively, red agents) are le when mixed coalitions with blue majority have been formed. So,
the red agents in R′ and the blue agents in B′ have opposite peaks, i.e., we have either
• pr > 12 for all r ∈ R′ and pb 6 12 for all b ∈ B′; or
• pr 6 12 for all r ∈ R′ and pb > 12 for all b ∈ B′.
us, for each agent who would like to join, one of the agents in the pair would not accept such a
deviation. 
Lemma 4.13. e partition pi is individually stable.
Proof. We rst observe that pi is individually rational. Indeed, all singletons in pi are individually
rational. Also, all mixed pairs are individually rational, since they prefer a coalition of ratio 12
to being in a singleton coalition. All coalitions in piR and piB are individually rational by Lemma
4.11(a).
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We will now show that pi satises individual stability. Take any red agent r ∈ R. We note that by
individual rationality r has no incentive to deviate to red-only coalitions; also, by Lemma 4.12, r
cannot deviate to a coalition in pipair. Further, by Lemma 4.11(c), agent r has no IS-deviation to a
coalition in piB . us, it remains to check whether r has an IS-deviation to a coalition in piR , or a
blue singleton in pisingle. Consider the following cases:
(1) Agent r joined S ∈ piR before Step 11 of Algorithm 2.
By Lemmas 4.3 and 4.6, agent r weakly prefers S to a mixed pair before accepting the deviation of
red agents at Step 11 of Algorithm 2, and by transitivity, this remains true aer Step 11 of Algorithm
2, meaning that r does not have an incentive to join a blue singleton. Also, r has no IS-deviation to
a coalition in piR by Lemmata 4.9 and 4.10.
(2) Agent r joined S ∈ piR at Step 11 of Algorithm 2.
By individual rationality, agent r weakly prefers his coalition to forming his own singleton. Hence,
if r has an IS-deviation to a coalition of a single blue agent in pisingle, then it means that both agent
strictly prefer a mixed pair to their own singleton coalitions and hence they would have formed a
pair at Step 5, a contradiction. Also, if agent r has an IS-deviation to some coalition T ∈ piR , then it
means that no red agent joined T at Step 11 of Algorithm 2 by Lemma 4.11(c), and thus agent r
would have joined T instead of S , a contradiction.
(3) Agent r belongs to a coalition S ∈ piB .
By construction of the algorithm, we have pr 6 12 , and agent r weakly prefers S to a mixed pair
before accepting the deviation of blue agents at Step 11 of Algorithm 2. By transitivity, this remains
true aer Step 11 of Algorithm 2, which means that r prefers his coalition to a coalition with blue
ratio at most 12 . us, r has no incentive to deviate to a coalition in piR , or to a blue-only coalition.
(4) Agent r belongs to a coalition in pipair.
Clearly, agent r has no incentive to deviate to singleton coalitions of blue agents. Also, if r has
an IS-deviation to some coalition T ∈ piR , r would have joined T at Step 19 of Algorithm 1, a
contradiction.
(5) Agent r belongs to a coalition in pisingle.
Again, if r has an IS-deviation to some coalition T ∈ piR , r could have joined T at Step 11 of
Algorithm 2, a contradiction. Also, if r has an IS-deviation to some coalition in pisingle that consists
of a single blue agent b, then both r and b could have formed a pair at Step 5, a contradiction.
A symmetric argument applies to blue agents’ deviations, and hence no blue agent has an
IS-deviation to other coalitions. 
5 CONCLUSION
We have initiated the formal study of coalition formation games with varying degree of homophily
and heterophily. Our results suggest several directions for future work.
First, while we have argued that Nash stable outcomes may fail to exist, the complexity of
deciding whether a given diversity game admits a Nash stable outcome remains unknown. Also,
we have obtained an existence result for individual stability under the assumption that agent’s
preferences are single-peaked, but it is not clear if the single-peakedness assumption is necessary;
in fact, we do not have an example of a diversity game with no individually stable outcome. In a
similar vein, it would be desirable to identify further special classes of diversity games that admit
core stable outcomes or at least ecient algorithms for deciding whether the core is non-empty.
More broadly, it would be interesting to extend our model to more than two agent types. Another
possible extension is to consider the seing where agents are located on a social network, and
each agent’s preference over coalitions is determined by the fraction of her acquaintances in these
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coalitions; this model would capture both the seing considered in our work and fractional hedonic
games.
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